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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
cision on the facts. And, finally, a listing and discussion of past fact situa-
tions, though of great value to historians, would be of very limited use to
the attorney.
The approach employed attempted to utilize these other approaches,
in part, but great stress was placed on the practical application of this rule
in an effort to present it as the functional, social tool it is rather than as just
another absolute legal rule. The conclusions reached are few, general, and
(of necessity) deal in great part with the jurisprudential aspects of this
constitutional rule.
The primary consideration of the courts is the purpose behind the
passage of Article III, Section 16, and the relation of the questioned statute
to this purpose. Order and reasonable notice being the two aims of this
section, statutes which would seem to violate the letter of this rule have been
upheld in the absence of confusion or lack of notice. By treating the "sub-
ject-title" rule in this manner, the evils intended to be affected by its pas-
sage are eliminated without creating a blind and arbitrary legal rule.
Advice to the legislator is also simple and general. The most glaring
and prevalent legislative error has been the restrictive and/or insufficient
title. The simple solution to this problem is, as presented in the suggested
drafting outline in the text, more comprehensive and detailed titles. No
statute has ever been voided due solely to the excessive length of its title.
When doubt exists, the subject should be set out and labeled as such and
the objects enumerated in such length and detail as to dispel all doubt.
There seem to be no improvements needed or changes desired in the
way that the courts have interpreted and applied the "subject-title" rule.
The only real need existing is that of remedying the apparent insensitivity
of the legislature to the judicial attitude. When this sensitivity is developed
in the legislature, consistent compliance with the dictates of Article i1,





Decisions arising in the federal courts through diversity of citizenship'
between adverse litigants have manifested a marked intent to conform to
state law, where applicable, since the coming of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.2
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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i the Erie case and others that followed, the Supreme Court has made
it quite clear that the federal courts are to guide themselves in diversity
suits, strictly by the letter of the law of the state wherein the action is
litigated. Nevertheless, there remains a reluctance in the federal courts
to forego hearing certain diversity suits even in the face of such a mandate
as Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 4 In interpreting the nature of a state law
the federal tribunals employ the test of "substance" or "procedure." The
court can, by using this test, interpret a state law as procedural and there-
fore not applicable in federal courts.5 This test is fundamentally sound
when testing a state law of whose nature there can be no doubt. The
inadequacy of this test, however, comes to light when the court is faced
with a state law which in some aspects is substantive and in other aspects
is procedural. The law may only be interpreted as either black or white,
leaving without answer those problems involving laws constituting the
gray areas bordering on the line of the "great divide"0 between substantive
and procedural law.
Why do the federal courts continue, in many cases, to apply and
insist upon the accuracy of this rule of thumb in decisions tinged with
gray? The trend in federal courts today is to give greater meaning and
effect to state law in many fields. Nevertheless, on the subject of non-
resident administrators the trend is to disregard state authority.7
Nomusmr-r ADMINISTRATORS
It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that suits can be
maintained in federal courts by executors or administrators who are
citizens of a foreign state, on the basis that they are the real parties in
interest and succeed to the rights of the testator or intestate. It makes
no difference that the decedent could not have brought the same action
in the federal courts; nor that the legatees or creditors of the decedent
are citizens of the same state as the defendant.9
3. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947); Guaranty r'ust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 (1945); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109 (1943); Klaxson v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Cities Service v. Dunlap,
308 U.S. 2089(1939).
4. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
5. Lupton's Sons v. Auto Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912); B&O R.R. v. Baugh, 149
U.S. 368 (1893); Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
6. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
7. Erwin v. Barrow, 217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1954); Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d
115 (6th Cir. 1936); Ilellrung v. Lafayette Trust Co., 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa
1950); Stewart v. Patton, 32 F. Supp. 675 (W.D. Tenn. 1940).
8. FEn. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
9. Mecom v. Fitzsimons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931; Memphis Ry. Co. v.
Moore, 243 U.S. 299 (1917); Rice v. Houston, 80 U.S. 66 (1871); Coal Co. v. Blatch-
ford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1870); Huff v. Hutchinson, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 586
(1852); McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 15 (1844); Irvine v. Lowry, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 298 (1841); Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 856 (1824);
Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 669 (1823); Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch.
306 (U.S, 1809).
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In Rice v. Houston,10 the administrator was appointed in Tennessee
while a resident there. Subsequently he became a permanent resident of
Kentucky. Suit was then filed in the Tennessee federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship, since the administrator was now a non-
resident of Tennessee. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that since the
law of Tennessee did not require the administrator to remain a Tennessee
resident, his authority continued. Therefore, the requisite diversity existed
for federal jurisdiction. In Memphis Ry. v. Moore," an Arkansas citizen
was appointed administrator of a Tennessee decedent. Suit was in the
federal court on diversity. The case involved the construction of a Tennessee
statute which provided that a nonresident of Tennessee who qualifies as
an administrator, for the purpose of suing or being sued, shall be
considered a citizen of Tennessee? 2 The Supreme Court held that the sole
purpose of the act was to extend, to such administrators, who qualify, the
privilege of bringing suit in the state courts, and was not intended to
exclude nonresident administrators from seeking relief in federal courts.'3
In the Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co.4 case, the plaintiffs
attempted to keep the litigation in the state court. Mrs. Smith, the
decedent's widow, was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate.
As a resident of Oklahoma, she brought suit in the Oklahoma state court
against the defendant, a Louisiana corporation. The case was removed
to the federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Mrs.
Smith dismissed the action and resigned as administratrix. Thereafter,
Mecom, a Louisiana citizen, was duly appointed administrator and promptly
filed suit in the Oklahoma state court. On defendant's motion the case was
again removed to the federal court, for which Mecom brought error. The
Supreme Court held that the cause should be remanded to the state
court of competent jurisdiction since, in fact, no diversity of citizenship
existed between the litigants, both plaintiff and defendant being citizens
of Louisiana. The court further held that the diverse citizenship of the
beneficiaries of the estate was not controlling in determining federal
jurisdiction.
In Envin v. Barrow,' 5 a nonresident administrator, appointed under
the laws of Oklahoma, brought suit in the federal district court to annul
deeds executed and delivered by the decedent during his life time. On
appeal, the circuit court ruled that the administrator, being the real party
in interest, 6 could bring the suit even though his decedent could not.
10. 80 U.S. 66 (1871).
11. 243 U.S. 299 (1917).
12. ACTS or' TENN. c. 501, p. 1344 (1903).
13. The court considered the decisions of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Southern
Ry. v. Maxwell, 113 Tenn. 464, 82 S.W. 1137 (1904).
14. 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
15. Erwin v. Barrow, 217 F.2d 522 (10th Cir. 1954).
16. Note 8 supra.
COMMENTS
In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the following
Oklahoma laws were inapplicable:
Action for the recovery of any property, real or personal . . . may
be maintained by and against executors and administrators in
all cases and in the same courts (emphasis supplied) in which the
same right might have been maintained by or against their
respective testators and intestates17
Actions for the following causes must be brought in the county
in which the subject of the action is situated . . . 4th, To
set aside a conveyance of . . . real property. 8
The use of the words "same courts" in section 25219 suggests the conclusion
that the intent of the statute is to limit the right of an administrator
to bring suit only in those courts which would have been available to the
decedent. The decedent could have brought suit in the federal courts on
the basis of diversity since he was an Oklahoma citizen. As such, a non-
resident administrator is privileged under the state law to bring suit only
in state courts. The intent of the Oklahoma law is to close its judicial
doors to those litigants who do not comply with both statutes. The
court also pointed out that section 13120 is merely a venue statute and
not substantive in nature. But, read in conjunction with section 252, it
clearly shows the statutory intent to limit real property actions to the
county wherein the land lies,2' and to restrict real property actions to
those counties, exclusive of federal jurisdiction.22
Here, then, is an example of a federal court circumventing a state
law by giving it a "procedural" interpretation, thereby eliminating a function
ordinarily exercised by state courts.
THE CLOSED DOOR Doc-rIuNF,
In diversity cases, the federal courts plainly bold themselves out as
merely being just another state court,2  and if the state's doors are closed
to a litigant, so are the federal courts in that state.24  The Woods v.
17. OKLA. STA'S. ANN., tit. 58, § 252 (1951).
18. Id tit. 12 § 131 (1951).
19. Note 17 supra
20. Note 18 supra.
21. See the following Oklahoma decisions: Ilarber v. McKeown, 195 Okla. 290,
157 P.2d 753 (1945) (the law vesting the court of a county in which real estate is
situated with exclusive jurisdiction of action involving such real estate is controlling);
State ex rel Murray v. Mortgage Corp., 175 Okla. 503, 53 P.2d 560 (1936) (venue is
not waived); First National Bank v. Henshaw 169 Okla. 49, 35 P.2d 898 (1934) (hold-
ing that improper venue constitutes no jurisdiction); Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 107 Okla.
140, 231 Pac. 237 (1824) (other parties have an interest besides an administrator).
22. Whether the state of Oklahoma in conformity with the Federal Constitution,
can exclude federal courts from taking jurisdiction of this type case is not under considera-
tion. The only question is whether this is the intent of the state law.
23. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U-S. 535 (1949).
24. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (19453. Cf., Cohen v. Beneficial
Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530
(1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
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Interstate Realty,2 5 case was a suit for broker's commission by a foreign
corporation. The Supreme Court held20 that such a corporation could not
maintain a suit in the federal court because of diversity, since under state
law 27 the corporation was precluded from maintaining any action in any
"courts of this state" upon failure to qualify to do business in that state.
When a stockholder bought a derivative action 28 in a federal court based
on diversity of citizenship, it was held that the federal courts are bound
to apply a statute 29 of the forum, which makes an unsuccessful plaintiff
liable for all expenses of defense and requires security as a condition precedent
for prosecuting the action.30 In the decision, the court determined that
the New Jersey law was substantive in nature and not in conflict with
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 ' Therefore, the federal
court was bound to follow the state law and close its doors to a plaintiff
who could not post the security. The Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 2
was an action for wrongful death in the federal district court of Kansas,
federal jurisdiction being based on diversity of citizenship. Service was
had on the defendant after the Kansas two-year limitation for the action 3
had expired. The Supreme Court decided that as the action was barred
in the state court, it was barred in the federal court, since Rule 3 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 4 could not give longer life to a state-
created substantive right than was given by the state law. If the state
closed its doors, the doors of the federal court were also closed.
The danger in these decisions, however, is that the court persisted
in relying upon the "procedure vs. substance" test. As eloquently as the
court held those state laws to be substantive and controlling, so too could
the court have otherwise decided that the laws were procedural. Earlier
decisions support this conclusion.1
The Guaranty Trust case, appeared to discard this slide-rule method
of administering justice. That action was based on diversity of citizenship,
wherein the court held that when the equitable right was created and
governed by state statute, the federal court was bound to recognize and
25. Note 23 supra.
26. Overruling Lupton's Sons Co. v. Auto Club of America. 225 U.S. 489 (1912)
as beiug obsolete. There, a New York statute, LAws or N.Y. c. 563, § 15 (1890),
prohibited suit in New York courts by foreign corporations which did not file a certificate
of authority to do business. The court held the statute did not preclude suit in the
federal court, where, under the general law, the contract was valid and enforceable.
27. MIss. CODE ANN. § 5319 (1942).
28. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
29. NJSA I4: 3 - 15 to - 17 (1948).
30. Id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b).
32. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
33. GEN. STAT. KAN. 60-306, 60-308 (1935).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
35. B & W Taxi Co. v. B & Y Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928); Lupton's Sons Co.
v. Auto Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912); B & 0 R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893)
(wherein Justice Field dissented and strongly urged that state law should be presented,
for the Constitution gives no power to the federal courts to replace state law).
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follow it in determining the rights of the parties concerned. The procedural
rule creates and defines the substantive right in many instances, and the
federal courts can not diminish the effect of such state procedural law. The
court now applied a different test, as stated in the opinion by Justice
Frankfurter:
And so the question is not whether a statute is deemed a matter of
'procedure' in some sense. The question is . . . does it significantly
affect the result of a litigation for the federal court to disregard a
law of a state that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a state court. (emphasis
supplied) 
36
In other words, the test determines the difference in result, assuming the
same suit were litigated in both the state and federal court. This guidepost
of what would be the "outcome" of the same case in a state court seems
wise. It is perplexing, however, that the Supreme Court in the Ragan and
Woods cases, although many times citing the Guaranty Trust case, never-
theless clung to the older theory, even though the newer and apparently
more workable test would have produced the same decisions.
What has this to do with nonresident administrators in diversity suits,
and why the concern?
DISCRIMINATION AGAINsT RESmENTS
In considering what has been said thus far, we have concluded first,
that nonresident administrators can bring actions in the federal courts
on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Secondly, where the state courts
have closed their doors to a litigant, the federal courts must also close their
doors. Thirdly, the Supreme Court has developed a pragmatic test by which
the federal courts can guide themselves in diversity suits, namely, what
would be the "outcome" of the same suit in a state court. Fourthly, the
federal courts have continually persisted in relying on the procedure-sub-
stance test in determining whether federal or state law is controlling in a
suit founded on diversity of citizenship.
In the Woods case, the pertinent part of the statute precluded a cor-
poration from suing in any "courts of this state." The court construed
the words, to mean not only state courts, but also federal courts in that
state. The statute under consideration in the Erwin case includes the words
"same courts," in requiring the decedent's administrator to bring an action
involving the annulment of a deed only in the courts in which his decedent
could sue. The decedent could not bring suit in the federal courts, for
his citizenship was the same as that of the defendant. Nevertheless, the
circuit court construed the state law as not intending to preclude the
administrator from bringing the local action in the federal district court.
Further, the decedent would have been required to bring the action in the
36. 326 U.S. 99 at 109 (1945).
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county where the realty in question was situated. This treatment of state
law results in unjust discrimination against those interested parties, who,
by misfortune, happen to be residents of the forum. By avoiding the test
of what would be the "outcome," the court interpreted the venue statute
to be merely procedural and not controlling. The facts of the Memphis Ry.
case were much the same. However, it was decided in 1917, twenty-one
years before the birth of the Erie Doctrine, and the court declared that
irrespective of a state ruling, it would independently construct the statutory
law of Tennessee." Modern trends would seem to indicate that the case
is no longer authoritative. There have been other decisions in the not-too-
distant past which also seem questionable, and which resulted in divestment
of state authority, and discrimination against state residents.38 As late as
1945 in Krisor v. Watts,39 a federal district court held that a Wisconsin
statute of limitation was not controlling in the federal courts40 as the action
was not barred under the Federal Rules.
41
Another distressing feature is the fact that federal courts will hear
cases even when there is obvious collusion in an effort to gain federal
jurisdiction.1 2 In Stewart v. Patton,43 a non-resident of Tennessee was
appointed administrator in that state for the sole purpose of gaining access
to the federal courts. Such motive was readily admitted by the plaintiff's
attorney, and the plaintiff himself confessed to be a stranger to the
action. Nevertheless, in following the Mecom decision, the court maintained
that the collusion practiced by the plaintiff and his attorneys was immaterial.
Another decision which resulted in the usurpation of state functions was
Hellrung v. Lafayette Trust Co.44 There, an Indiana statute45 provided that
suits shall not be filed against administrators, but instead, the claimants
were required to file a statement of claim in the court in which the estate
was pending. The plaintiff, a nonresident, filed suit in federal court for
wrongful death. It was held that the Indiana law did not restrict the power
of the federal court to hear and determine a death action against the
administrator. Was it not the purpose of the Indiana statute to limit
actions in an effort to speed up estate administration instead of having a
possible string of suits pendng in numerous courts against the administrator?
Did not this decision result in discrimination against interested Indiana
37. 243 U.S. 299 at 301 (1917).
38. Diederich v. American News Co., 128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942) (holding an
Oklahoma constitutional provision as not controlling in cases in the federal courts sitting
in Oklahoma); Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1936); Hellrung v. Lafayette
Trust Co., 102 F. Supp, 822 (D.C. Ind. 1951); Krisor v. Watts, 61 F. Supp, 845
(D.C. Wis. 1945); Stewart v. Patton, 32 F. Supp. 675 (\V.D. Tenn. 1940).
39. 61 F. Supp 845 (D.C. Wis. 1945).
40. Compate, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, note 4 supra.
41. FED. R, CIV. P. 3.
42. Redditt v. Hale, 184 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1950); Harrison v. Love, 81 F.2d
115 (6th Cir. 1936); Stewart v. Patton, 32 F. Supp. 675 (V.D. Tenn. 1940).
43. 32 F. Supp. 675 (W.I). Tenn. 1940),
44. 102 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1951).
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citizens who were bound to follow the state law.45  Should not the district
court have declined jurisdiction? The real purpose of conformity in diversity
suits is more than merely deciding the outcome of a case. As stated by
the court in Weiss v. Routh:'
It is that the accident of citizenship shall not change the outcome:
a purpose which extends as much to determining whether the
court shall act at all, as to how it shall decide, if it does.
The situations outlined above are reminiscent of Black 6 White
Taxi v. Brown 6 Yellow Taxi,47 wherein the litigants were able to "go
shopping" for the court which would be most sympathetic to them. The
discriminatory possibilities of the Black 6 White situation were severely
criticized by Justice Brandeis 48 in his repudiation of Swift v. Tyson,49 as
part of the "unconstitutional course."
To reflect, we see in the Hellrung case that a resident could not file
an action against an administrator for wrongful death. In the Erwin case,
a resident could not sue in the federal court. In the Krisor case the action
in the state court would have been barred. Applying the "outcome" test
of Guaranty Trust, it is not doubtful that the decisions should have been
otherwise, for as stated in that case:
Certainly, the fortuitous circumstances of residence out of state
of one of the parties to a litigation ought not to give rise to a
discrimination against others equally concerned but locally
resident.50
REAFFIRMA'ION OF STATE POWERS
There must be some middleground established to overcome the federal
pressure which works an injustice on residents in nonresident administrator
cases, and which deprives the states of the privilege 5' of conducting internal
affairs free from the fearful "brooding omnipresence" of the federal courts.
Three fairly recent lower federal court cases approach this middle-
ground. In Pierce v. Hildebrand,52 a California citizen brought suit in the
federal district court of Iowa to be declared a one-sixth owner of the
estate of the deceased. In declining jurisdiction of the case, the district
court looked beyond the pleadings (defendants included the executor and
eight other parties, all Iowa citizens) and arranged the parties according
to their actual sides in the suit. The result showed Iowa citizens to be
arrayed against Iowa citizens. Hence, no real diversity existed for federal
jurisdiction, even though the plaintiff's and administrator's citizenship
45. BUaN's ANN. STAT. IND. § 6 - 1001 (1950).
46. 149 F,2d 193 at 195 (2d Cir. 1945).
47. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
48. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
49. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) (1842).
50. 326 U.S. 99 at 112 (1945).
51. B & 0 R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893).
52. 103 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Iowa 1952).
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was diverse. In so holding, the court emphasized the fact that it could
not draw to it the administration of estates which were being handled by
the state probate court.55
Another case in which jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship
is Hoosier Gas Co. v. Fox.54 ' The court would not apply federal procedural
law to allow an injured person to maintain a counterclaim against the
liability insurer, since the state law," and policy of Iowa requires as a
condition precedent to filing suit against the insurer, that the injured party
must obtain judgment against, and execution returned unsatisfied from,
the insured tort-feasor 6
In Bolitho v. Buck Express,57 it was held that when a plaintiff sues
in a representative capacity, her capacity shall be determined by the laws
of the state.58 So, even where the requisite diversity exists, if the party
does not have the capacity under the state law, such capacity can not
be extended by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
CONCLUSION
To be effective, state law regarding nonresident administrators must,
in some measure, be recognized and followed by the federal courts in
diversity suits. The continued acceptance and pursuance of the decisions
in the Mecom and Memphis Ry. cases, is not likely to end in justice, mainly
because of the discrimination against state citizens. Being at the crossroads,
perhaps the federal courts should alter their course and move in a
direction which will give greater effect to state law and policy regarding
the administration of estates by nonresidents. The failure of the federal
courts to sufficiently recognize state law in this field has created and will
continue to create evils no less impairing, for instance, than the Black 6
White Taxi case.
It is incumbent upon the federal courts to go beyond the formal
pleadings of a suit. For the administrator, although considered the real
party in interest for the purpose of maintaining or defending an action, is
in reality a stranger to the benefits or costs that may accrue from such a
suit, The parties to benefit should be considered as much as, if not more
than, an administrator, particularly when determining whether the parties
to a suit have the requisite diversity for federal jurisdiction. Those parties,
53. Compare, Ilellrung v. Lafayette Trost Co., note 44 supra.
54. 102 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
55. IOWA CODE ANN. § 516.1; Rules 1 - 28 (1951).
56. The court holding that in view of the Erie Doctrine federal procedural law
must give way to state law and policy in diversity suits,
57. 12 F.R.D. 189 (E.I) Pa. 1951).
58. PA. R. Civ. P. Nos. 2201 and 2202(a); 20 P.S. PA. § 320.1101 (1949). Here
the plaintiff was administratrix ad prosequendum but state law required suit to be
brought by general administratrix only.
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
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including heirs, legatees, and beneficiaries, are not, under the law, the real
parties in interest. Neverthelss, they have an "interest which is real." A
slackening of the rigidness of rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules, in this
respect, would aid greatly in developing a modern and just approach in
deciding cases involving nonresident administrators.
It is further suggested that the federal courts adopt and apply the
"outcome" test as described earlier. Such application would bridge the
gap between substantive and procedural law. Every state law thus con-
sidered by the federal courts could be uniformly tested.
It is logically concluded that the ultimate results of the present federal
policy, if followed, will end in large-scale removal from state courts of
the litigation of all suits wherein one of the parties, by circumstance, is a
nonresident administrator. It is further concluded that this would not be
the result if the state laws governing decedent administration were primarily
considered.
PAuL Low
VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The large number of federal procurement contracts, attended by
numerous disputes involving these contracts, and the spectre of ever-
lengthening dockets in the Federal Courts, has drawn attention to the
validity of arbitration provisions which may be placed in a procurement
contract.
The process of arbitration, as the term will be employed in this com-
ment, is to be distinguished from a process provided for by a clause contained
in many procurement contracts, which shall be termed the "determination
clause." Under the determination clause the contracting officer, subject
to review by some other government official in some instances, decides any
dispute under the contract.1
Arbitration has been defined as '... a mode of settling differences
through investigation and determination, by one or more unofficial persons
selected as a domestic tribunal for the purpose, of some disputed matter
submitted to them by contending parties for decision and award .... ,2
An arbitration proceeding is judicial in nature,3 and the parties to an
1. 41 U.SC. § 52.6 (appendix) providing for the handling of disputes; See 41
U.S.C. § 54.21, art. 12, which is the standard government supply contract disputes
provision.
2. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Henry Ericsson Co., 197 La. 732, 2 So.2d
945 (1941).
3. Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging Co., v. Lake Washington Shipyards, 1 Wash.
2d 401, 96 P.2d 257 (1939).
